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Abstract 
Income inequality and house prices have risen sharply in developed countries during 1975-
2010. In line with theoretical models, we argue that this co-movement is no coincidence, but 
that inequality has driven up house prices on the grounds that it raises the aggregate demand 
for housing. Our results suggest that absolute inequality and house prices in most OECD 
countries were positively correlated and cointegrated, whereas relative inequality and mean 
income were not significant long-run determinants. This finding indicates that the surge in 
OECD house prices in part can be explained by a top-income-induced increase in housing 
demand, and that it is important to consider the interaction of rising mean income and its 
relative distribution when studying potential correlates of house prices. Moreover, our results 
confirm previous findings that the short-term real interest rate also is an important correlate 
of house prices. 
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Variations in house prices can have important macroeconomic effects. Rising prices stimulate 
consumption expenditure and economic growth when they increase the security feeling of 
homeowners and ease access to credit - so called wealth and collateral effects (Case et al., 2005, 
2013; Campbell, and Cocco, 2007; Hryshko et al., 2010). However, at the same time, easier 
access to credit can foster unsustainable debt-driven growth models and declining house prices 
can lead to large reductions in household consumption and prolonged recessions. Indeed, all 
these effects have been observed prior to, and after, the Great Recession (Hryshko et al., 2010; 
Mian et al., 2013; Jordá et al., 2014; Mian and Sufi, 2015; Goda et al., 2017). 
Moreover, starkly rising prices can make housing unaffordable. This especially concerns the 
most productive urban areas and low-income households (Dewilde and Lancee, 2013; Gyourko 
et al., 2013)1. Finally, house price inflation can translate into retail price inflation (Stroebel and 
Vavra, 2014), which can have important implications for monetary policy and is also seen to 
affect mainly low-income households (see Easterly and Fischer (2001) on the latter).  
Considering these potential socio-economic effects, it is not surprising that a vast literature 
on the dynamics of house prices exist (especially in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis). 
Typically, income is identified as an important determinant of house prices (see e.g., Case and 
Shiller, 2003; ECB, 2003; Sommer et al., 2013). However, in developed countries since “the 
final decades of the twentieth century, house price growth outpaced income growth by a 
substantial margin” (Knoll et al., 2017: 338).  
Recent literature suggests that this phenomenon is mainly explained by low real interest rates 
coupled with credit expansion (Taylor, 2007; Goodhart and Hofman, 2008; Gerdesmeier et al., 
2010; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011; Bordo and London-Lane, 2013a). Other studies also 
                                                 
1 In the UK, for example, “Homes in popular towns and London boroughs have risen to 10 and 20 times local 
incomes, while rents account for up to 78% of earnings” (Collinson, 2015). However, it is important to note that 
“while the increase in house prices has been most pronounced in cities, it is not exclusively an urban phenomenon” 
(Knoll et al., 2017: 343). 
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consider financial innovation and deregulation (Dokko et al., 2011; Bordo and London-Lane, 
2013b), and global liquidity (Sá et al., 2014; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015) as explanatory factors. 
All these determinants have in common that they are seen to increase the total demand for 
housing, which leads to increasing prices taking into account that land and housing supply is 
restricted. However, another common feature of all these determinants is that their effects 
mostly took place in the first decade of the twenty-first century, while house prices have 
increased strongly since the 1970s. The aim of the present paper is to assess rising income 
inequality as an additional (as yet unexamined) contributing factor for the strong increase in 
house prices during the period 1975-2010. 
Theoretical models provide two potential mechanisms that link inequality to house prices: 
(i) with rising inequality the number of households that are willing to pay higher prices for their 
homes increases (Gyourko et al., 2013; Määttänen and Terviö, 2014); (ii) houses are an 
investment good for the upper part of the income distribution and in more unequal countries the 
investment demand is higher (Nakajima, 2005; Zhang, 2016). In both cases, the rise in demand 
is expected to drive up house prices when supply restrictions are considered.2 
It is well established that house ownership is very unevenly distributed. In OECD countries 
the top 10% of the income distribution typically owns between 40% (Italy) and 60% (US) of 
houses, while the Gini coefficient ranges between 0.6 and 0.7 (Cowell et al., 2012), even rising 
to above 0.9 when only non-primary residences are considered (Bonesmo Fredriksen, 2012). It 
is also well established that income inequality increased starkly in most developed countries 
after 1980, especially due to income concentration at the top (OECD, 2015).  
Considering the above, our hypothesis is that the long-run co-movement of income 
inequality and house prices is no coincidence, but that the increase in inequality has driven up 
housing demand and, in turn, their prices. To our best knowledge, no previous study has 
                                                 
2 The view that land and house supply is restricted is backed by Knoll et al.’s (2017: 349) observation that the 
“surge in house prices was due to sharply rising land prices” and not due to rising construction costs. 
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empirically tested if the stark increase in real house prices in developed countries during the 
last decades was partly driven by rising income inequality. 
To close this gap in the literature, and test our hypothesis, the present study employs two 
methods. First, the bias-corrected dynamic panel fixed-effects estimator (Bruno, 2005a; 2005b) 
is used to quantify the impact of inequality on house prices for a panel of 15 OECD countries 
for the period 1975-2010. The models are estimated in autoregressive distributed lag form to 
recognize the evident nonstationarity of house prices, inequality and other data and thereby 
attempt to avoid problems of spurious regression. Second, the obtained fixed-effects results are 
corroborated with panel cointegration-based methods that are designed to take account for such 
nonstationarity of data whilst also allowing for cross-sectional dependence in the panel 
(Westerlund, 2007).  
A further novelty of our study is that we will use both absolute and relative inequality 
measures to test our hypothesis. The measures for relative inequality are the Gini coefficient 
and the Top 5% income share, while the variance and the market income of the Top 5% are 
used as absolute inequality measures. The difference between relative and absolute inequality 
measures is that the former show proportional income differences, while the latter capture the 
interaction of relative inequality with mean income (variance) and the available income at the 
top (Top 5% income).  
Studies that investigate the impact of inequality on socio-economic variables like growth 
and crime typically only account for relative inequality measures. However, absolute and 
relative inequality trends tend to be quite different (see Ravallion, 2004; Atkinson and 
Brandolini, 2010, Goda and Torres, 2017), and we expect that absolute inequality measures are 
more suitable for our purpose because theoretical models argue that both the distribution and 
the level of income affect house prices.  
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Indeed, we find that absolute income inequality and real house prices in most OECD 
countries are positively correlated and cointegrated in the long-run (with the notable exception 
of Germany, Japan, and Korea), whereas relative inequality is not. The latter is also true for real 
GDP per capita, although we find a significant short-run effect of mean income on house prices 
(as reported by Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) and Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015)). In line with the 
literature discussed above, our results also suggest that low short-term real interest rates have 
additionally contributed to the long-run house price surge. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 details the theoretical link between inequality 
and house prices. Section 3 empirically tests if income inequality is a long-run correlate of 
house prices in OECD countries. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The theoretical link between (absolute) inequality and house prices 
The theoretical models that examine whether inequality affects house prices are typically 
general equilibrium models that have three main conditions in common: First, the existence of 
heterogeneous agents, so that inequalities can be analyzed. Second, housing supply is assumed 
to be at least very inelastic, so that the housing market adjusts to demand shocks by price 
changes. Third, the presence of frictions that limit access to the housing market. 
According to these models, inequality can affect house prices via two demand mechanisms. 
The first considers houses as consumption goods, where an increase in income inequality 
increases the amount of people that are willing to pay high prices for their preferred residence 
(Matlack and Vigdor, 2008; Gyourko et al., 2013; Määttänen and Terviö, 2014) 3. The second 
focusses on houses as rent-generating assets, where inequality increases the absolute amount of 
savings, which in turn raises the demand for housing as investment assets (Nakajima, 2005; 
                                                 
3 In general, these models assume the existence of different kinds of houses. Depending on their location or quality, 
some houses are preferred over others by households. 
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Zhang, 2016). Given that the supply of housing is assumed to be limited, in both cases an 
inequality-induced demand increase leads to a rise in house prices. 
To illustrate the theoretical mechanism, Zhang’s (2016) framework is especially useful for 
our purpose because it considers houses as consumption goods and investment assets. The 
model supposes the existence of an endowment economy with two types of household: top 
earners with a population share of 𝜇 and an income share of 𝜋, and bottom earners with a 
population share of 1 − 𝜇 and an income share of 1 − 𝜋. Total income (𝑌) and the total amount 
of houses (𝐻) are fixed and exogenous. 
Households go through two periods, young and old. During the first period they are 
productive and save part of their income, while the financial return of these savings is consumed 
completely during the second period, when households are old and unproductive. Young 
households invest their savings either in bonds or houses (the amount of bonds and housing that 
are demanded is denoted as 𝑏 and ℎ, respectively). Bonds are risk-free assets and pay a gross 
return of 1 + 𝑟, while houses as assets deliver a return of 𝑅/𝑃 (𝑃 is the house price and young 
and old households consume housing for a rent of 𝑅). The housing market has two financial 
frictions: First, households have a collateral constraint, so that they cannot borrow more than a 
certain fraction of the value of their house (𝜆ℎ). Second, the housing market has a minimum 
holding size requirement (ℎ̅). These frictions imply that not all households can participate in 
this market. 
During each period, households derive utility from consuming output (𝑐) and housing 
services (𝑠). The utility function (where 𝜑 is the weight of housing in the utility) is written as: 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑠) = (1 − 𝜑) ln(𝑐) + 𝜑ln (𝑠)  (1) 
Defining 𝑥 as the total expenditure during each period, and 𝛽 as the subjective discount 
factor, the consumption-saving problem and portfolio choice of young households can be 
expressed as follows: 
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max ln(𝑥) + 𝛽ln (𝑥′) (2) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑥 + 𝑏 + ℎ = 𝑦 
𝑥′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑏 + (𝑃 + 𝑅)ℎ 
𝑏 ≥ −𝜆ℎ𝑃ℎ (3) 
ℎ 𝜖 {0, [ℎ̅, +∞]} (4) 
Guaranteeing a stationary general equilibrium, the solution of this problem allows for the 
determination of the prices of 𝑅 and 𝑃, the demand of 𝑏 and ℎ, and 𝑥.  









In equilibrium, the fixed supply of housing, the high preference for housing (due to the form 
of the utility function) and the restrictions to participate in this market, imply that 𝑅/𝑃 > 1 +
𝑟. That is, houses are always preferred as an investment asset by all households, but bottom 
earners have restricted access to this market and mainly save in bonds.   
Equation (5) permits us to identify the main determinants of house prices, including 
inequality, however it is important to note that inequality can be measured in relative or in 
absolute terms. The former is the more widely used measure in the literature, referring to the 









Absolute inequality, on the contrary, can be understood as the absolute difference between the 



















 is the mean income of the society (denoting 𝑁 as the total population).  
                                                 
4 This price equilibrium is guaranteed under some specific assumptions related with the parameter values. Please 
see Zhang (2016) for more details. 
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Accordingly, an important distinction between these two concepts is that relative income 
differences are invariant to income (𝑌), whereas absolute ones are defined by the interaction 
between mean income and the relative income distribution.5 To make this point more tangible, 
Figure 1 shows the income distribution of three fictitious countries (A, B and C): A and B have 
the same relative income distribution but B has a higher mean income than A, while country C 
has the same mean income as B but its relative income distribution is more unequal. Although 
the relative income distribution in A and B is the same, the income distance between top and 
bottom earners is greater in B ($2,000) than in A ($1,000), given that B’s mean income is 
higher. Likewise, in C the income distance is greater ($8,000) than in B, due to C’s higher top 
income share. 
< Figure 1 > 
With these clarifications in mind, the relationship between inequality changes and house 
prices becomes clear. In (5), an increase in the top earners income share (𝜋) is associated with 
an increase in house prices. The explanation for this increase is a rising housing demand by top 
earners, whereas the demand of bottom earners stays constant. As shown above, an increase in 
𝜋 affects both relative and absolute inequality. 
A similar effect on demand and prices occurs when 𝑌 increases. According to the model, the 
resulting increase in the absolute difference between the mean income of top and bottom earners 
will be used by the top earners to invest in housing. As discussed above, this effect is not 
captured by relative inequality measures but only by absolute ones. Finally, housing demand 
and prices should be affected especially strongly when 𝜋 and 𝑌 are changing simultaneously, 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that the value of absolute inequality measures does not depend on the population size (see 




), π and µ, will stay the same, which implies that not only absolute and relative inequality will be the 
same as before, but also that house prices remain constant. 
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which typically happens. While such a simultaneous change alters both relative and absolute 
inequality, it affects absolute inequality more strongly.  
Hence, absolute inequality measures can be expected to be more comprehensive than relative 
ones when trying to capture the effect of income inequality on house prices. Indeed, Figure 2 
and 3 suggest that in most OECD countries real house prices are positively correlated with 
inequality, and that the correlation between absolute inequality and house prices is stronger 
than that of relative inequality.  
< Figure 2 > 
< Figure 3 > 
 
Please note that (5) also captures the price effect of a greater capacity of low-income 
households to participate in the housing market. That is, when the reduction of financial 
frictions lowers the minimum holding size requirement of low-income households (ℎ̅), and/or 
improves their access to credit (𝜆ℎ). The outcome of a decrease in ℎ̅ and/or increase of 𝜆ℎ is an 
increase in the aggregated demand for housing and thus their prices.6  
In line with this mechanism, some studies argue that the pre-crisis house price boom in the 
USA, Ireland and Spain was highly related with the increase of financial innovation and 
securitization, the strengthening and deepness of the mortgage credit market, and higher bank 
risk-taking (Mian and Suffi, 2009; Mian and Suffi, 2010; Addison-Smyth, 2009; Nieto, 2007; 
Jiménez et al., 2010). However, it is important to note that these developments mainly took 
place in the three above-mentioned countries, and that financial markets and developments were 
very heterogeneous between OECD countries (see Sá et al., 2014). 
Moreover, several studies argue that income inequality and wealth concentration played an 
important role in explaining the credit boom and the increase of financial innovation in the 
                                                 
6 Formally, it can be easily demonstrated in equation (5) that  
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝜆ℎ






USA: while income inequality contributed to the excess leverage of low- and middle-income 
households (Rajan 2010; van Treeck 2014; Bazillier and Hericourt 2017)7, rising wealth 
concentration put pressure on investors to demand collateralized debt securities (CDOs) on a 
mass scale (Lysandrou, 2011a; 2011b; Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). The interplay of these two 
developments is seen as an important driver for the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the 
subsequent recession (Goda et al., 2017). 
To conclude, based on the theoretical model and the suggestive data that were presented in 
Figures 1-2, our hypothesis is that rising inequality is an important factor explaining the 
increase in OECD house prices during the last decades. The remainder of this paper tests 
whether absolute and/or relative income inequality are statistically significant drivers of house 
prices in OECD countries. 
3. Is (absolute) inequality a correlate of house prices?  
3.1 The impact of inequality on house prices according to dynamic panel fixed-effects 
regressions 
3.1.1 Model specification and data 
To empirically test our hypothesis, we first use a bias-corrected dynamic panel fixed-effects 
estimator approach that allows us to consider dynamic long-run house price effects and country 
specific factors. The model has the following specification: 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛾0𝑖 + 𝛾11∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾12∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾13∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾14∆𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾21∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛾22∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾23∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾24∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾25∆𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡.  (6) 
                                                 
7 Rajan (2010) and Bazillier and Hericourt (2017) also argue that the stagnant low- and middle-income households 
might have pushed the US government to implement aggregate demand supporting policies and encouraged the 
US Fed to engage in monetary expansion. 
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where 𝑖 represents the country and 𝑡 the year, ln (𝐻𝑃) is the natural logarithm of the yearly 
averages of the OECD real house price index, 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 denotes different income inequality 
measures, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US$), 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝 
is the natural logarithm of the population size, and 𝑟 is the 3-month nominal interbank interest 
rate (adjusted with consumer price inflation). We estimate models involving various 
combinations of the variables specified in (6); however, we always include 𝛾0𝑖, being the cross-
sectional fixed-effects. 
We use the bias-corrected dynamic panel fixed-effects estimator discussed by Bruno (2005a; 
2005b) because the conventional fixed-effects estimator is known to be biased (see Nickell, 
1981). It is also more appropriate for panels with the small number of cross-sectional units (𝑁) 
that we have than the typically employed alternative estimators of, for example, Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that are only consistent 
as 𝑁 tends to infinity.8 For all estimated fixed-effects models we use the Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) estimator to obtain initial parameter estimates, the highest degree of accuracy in the bias 
correction (being an approximation up to 𝑂(𝑁−1𝑇−2)) and 800 replications in the bootstrapping 
of coefficient standard errors. 
These models are estimated in autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) form (involving 
differenced and levels variables) given our nonstationary data (see Appendix for unit root tests). 
The first differencing of I(1) variables ensure these differenced terms are stationary while the 
levels terms form a stationary linear combination if there is cointegration. Provided there is 
cointegration the estimates and test statistics will not be subject to spurious regression; however, 
                                                 
8 The fixed-effects estimator (least-squares dummy variable, LSDV, or using time demeaned data) will suffer from 
dynamic panel bias and inconsistency (as N tends to infinity) when 𝑇 is small. Nevertheless, when 𝑇 increases the 
bias and inconsistency of the fixed-effects estimator eventually disappears. However, Roodman (2006, pp. 17-18) 
notes that even when 𝑇=30 substantial bias (20%) can still remain in the estimator. We do not use dynamic panel 
generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimators (see, Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998) because they are only consistent as 𝑁 tends to infinity. Our panels have 𝑁=18 and 𝑁=15 




in the absence of cointegration the inferences from the model will not be valid. We can therefore 
only draw valid inference for sets of variables where there is cointegration (see our Westerlund 
tests below). The ADL form also allows us to identify whether covariates have a significant 
impact on house prices in the long-run and/or short-run.  
In accordance with the above discussed theoretical model and distinction between absolute 
and relative inequality measures, we account for the Top 5% income share (𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑖𝑡) and the 
market income of the Top 5% earners in constant US$ (𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑖𝑡)). Given that it is likely 
that the demand for housing is not solely influenced by top earners, the widely used Gini 
coefficient (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡) and income variance (𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡)) are additionally considered to measure 
relative and absolute changes in the overall distribution. The main difference between the Gini 
coefficient and the variance is that the former normalizes the sum of income differences with 
the mean income, whereas the variance subtracts the mean income from individual incomes.9 
The market Gini coefficient is retrieved from Solt’s Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database. The SWIID combines and adjusts Gini coefficients from different sources and 
currently is the most extensive publicly available database of income Gini coefficients that are 
comparable across countries and time.10 SWIID data have been widely used in previous studies 
concerned with income inequality.11 
The three other inequality variables are all estimated, given that they are not readily available 
for the sample. Following Goda and Torres García (2017), we first estimate ventile income 
shares (𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡) for each country and year under study (among them 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑖𝑡). The ventile income 
                                                 
9 See Chakravarty (2001) for an in depth-discussion about the similarities and differences between these two 
inequality measures. 
10 Please note that the procedure and the quality of the imputations of SWIID’s Version 4.0 has been heavily 
criticized by Jenkins (2015). However, we are using Version 5.0 of the SWIID and, according to Solt (2015), most 
of these shortcomings have been superseded in this version. 
11 See, for example, Bergh and Nilsson (2010), Fox and Hoelscher (2012), Agnello and Soussa (2014), Herzer et 
al. (2014), Chon (2015) and Goda and Torres García (2017). 
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shares enable us to derive the per capita income of each ventile12 (including 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑖𝑡)), 




∑ (𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑝𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡)
2
20
𝑝=1  (7) 
Mean income, population size and interest rates have been chosen as control variables 
because these are the most widely mentioned determinants of house prices. Higher mean 
income and a rise in population are expected to foster the demand for housing (see e.g., Case 
and Shiller, 2003). The same applies to low real interest rates, which increase the access to, and 
lower the financing costs of, mortgages. Hence expansionary monetary policy is the most 
studied potential driver behind the upsurge in OECD house prices (see e.g., Taylor, 2007; 
Goodhart and Hofman, 2008; Gerdesmeier et al., 2010; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011; Dokko 
et al., 2011, Bordo and Landon-Lane, 2013a). 
For the period 1975-2010 annual data for all of these variables is available for 18 OECD 
countries: Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), 
France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), the Netherlands 
(NET), New Zealand (NEW), Norway (NOR), South Korea (KOR), Spain (SPA), Sweden 
(SWE), the UK (UKD) and the USA (USA). 
However, we excluded Germany, Japan and Korea from the regressions because real house 
prices in these countries experienced a decline in the post-1990 period (see Figure 1 in Section 
2), which stands in stark contrast to the price rise in the other 15 countries; hence, questioning 
the homogeneity of coefficients across all 18 sample countries.13 In the case of Germany, this 
dissimilar pattern is partly explained by the relatively low share of home ownership, 
                                                 
12 𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑝𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡/0.05. 
13 The exclusion of these countries is also backed by unreported results from cointegrating equations of house 
prices on inequality measures (where cointegration was evident) by dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) for 
each of the 18 countries. These results suggest homogeneity of coefficients for only 15 of the countries and raise 
serious doubts that this homogeneity extends to Germany, Japan and Korea. These unreported results are available 
upon request from the authors. 
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governmental regulation and the reunification of East- and West-Germany (Hilbers et al., 
2008); in the case of Japan, by the bust of the house price boom in 1990, and the subsequent 
crisis and debt overhang (Krainer et al., 2010); and in the case of Korea, by governmental price 
controls and a massive increase in governmental housing supply (Kim and Cho, 2010). 
 
3.1.2 Results 
Table 1 reports the results for the panel of 15 OECD countries. The results do not reveal any 
clear long-run determinants of house prices for the period 1975-2010, given that none of the 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. The results do indicate, 
however, significant short-run effects of current GDP per capita growth on house prices growth. 
The finding that GDP growth affects house price growth positively is in line with the findings 
of previous studies (see e.g., Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015).  
<Table 1 > 
Moreover, the lagged level of house prices seems important to explain house price changes 
and house price error-correction behavior is evident (that is, 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 is statistically 
significant). While this finding suggests the need to use a dynamic panel estimator (such as the 
one we adopt), that there may be long-run effects and that the coefficient on 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 is 
broadly homogeneous for the sample countries, it remains unclear what the long-run 
determinants of house prices are.  
One likely reason explaining why all non-house price level variables are insignificant could 
be multicollinearity. GDP per capita is used to calculate absolute inequality (see (7) and 
Footnote 12), so that 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$) are strongly correlated with 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐). The 
simple correlation coefficient for 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) with 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟) is 0.74 and with 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$) 0.87 
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(see Table 1A in the Appendix), suggesting a high degree of imperfect collinearity between 
these pairs of variables.14 
Multicollinearity effects are known to reduce the precision of the estimation of parameters 
and can make coefficients appear insignificant when they would be significant in a more 
parsimonious specification. Moreover, they can make coefficient estimates very sensitive to 
small changes in data and potentially cause a change in the signs of coefficients – Asteriou and 
Hall (2016, p. 109) point out that in the presence of imperfect multicollinearity the “… signs of 
the estimated coefficients can be the opposite of those expected.” 
To consider whether the results are influenced by potential multicollinearity (and lack of 
precision in estimation15), and to disentangle the effects of the two variables, we therefore 
consider what happens if we omit either 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) or the 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 variables from the panel 
regressions.16 According to Table 2, the lagged level of mean income remains insignificant 
when the inequality variables are omitted from the regression. This consistent lack of an evident 
long-run effect of 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) is surprising; however, it is in line with some previous empirical 
findings (see e.g., Gallin, 2006; Mikhed and Zemcik, 2009; Knoll et al., 2017). 
< Table 2 > 
In line with mean income, the relative inequality measures are also not significant in any of 
the regressions when income is excluded from the model. However, the lagged level of the two 
absolute inequality measures (as well as their short-run differenced contemporaneous 
coefficients) become significant when mean income is omitted from the regression, which 
                                                 
14 The simple correlation coefficients between 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) and the other levels covariates included in the 
regressions in Table 1 and Table 2 are much lower, suggesting little problem of collinearity for these variables. 
That is, its correlation coefficient with 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 is 0.14, with 𝑇𝑜𝑝5% is 0.13, with 𝑟𝑡 is 0.11 and with 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝) is 
-0.13. 
15 There may also be some lack of precision in estimation when including the current and first differences as well 
as the lagged levels of all variables in the model. This issue can be addressed by considering the exclusion of some 
variables from the model. 
16 Please note that the main results of Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 do not change when overall income (real GDP) is 
considered as an explanatory variable (instead of real GDP per capita). 
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indicates that the surge in OECD house prices is partly explained by the rise in absolute income 
inequality. This finding is in line with the theoretical model discussed in Section 2 and the 
stylized fact that house ownership is very unevenly distributed in the OECD (see Cowell et al., 
2012), and suggests that housing demand partly depends on the absolute amount of income at 
the top. 
Given the double log specification, the coefficients can be interpreted as follows: according 
to the overall absolute inequality measure (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) a 1% rise in absolute inequality leads to an 
approximate 0.36% long-run increase in real house prices, while a 1% rise in the Top 5% market 
income (𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) leads to an approximate 0.69% long-run increase in real house prices.
17 
In addition to absolute inequality, the lagged level of the real interest rates shows a 
significant negative effect in the two regressions where absolute inequality is considered (and 
mean income is omitted). This effect is expected theoretically and in line with previous findings 
(as discussed in Section 3.1.1). Population size, on the other hand, is not significant in any of 
the regressions. 
Given that the absolute inequality measures (and the short-term real interest rate) are only 
significant at the 10%-level, we proceed with Westerlund cointegration tests to further 
investigate our findings. The significance of the lagged level of house prices at the 1%-level in 
all regressions with 15 countries in the panel, as well as the data from Figure 1, suggests that 
house prices are not stationary and can be interpreted as a sign of cointegration.18 Hence, it may 
be a lack of precision in estimation using the fixed-effects models that is making it difficult to 
uncover the significant long-run explanatory factors of house prices. 
  
                                                 





18 House prices could be deemed stationary if the coefficient on 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 is negative and significant and all other 
lagged level terms’ coefficients are insignificant (the so called lagged degenerate independent variables case) - see 
McNown et al. (2018). 
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3.2 Are Real House Prices and Income Inequality Cointegrated? 
3.2.1 Determining stationary, cointegration and causality 
To establish if the necessary condition for cointegration between real house prices (𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡)) 
and the explanatory variables is satisfied, first Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test (based upon 
truncated CADF statistics) is applied. In a second step Cerrato et al.’s (2009, 2011) 
heterogeneous nonlinear panel unit root test is used. Both tests account for cross-sectional 
dependence and we apply the sequential panel selection method (SPSM), proposed by 
Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009), to identify which cross-sections (countries) are stationary 
and which are nonstationary.  
The Cerrato et al. (2009, 2011) test assumes nonlinear adjustment (possibly approximating 
structural breaks) whereas the Pesaran (2007) test assumes linear adjustment. Since each test is 
most powerful for the adjustment it is designed for we infer stationarity if either test indicates 
stationary. Further, if either test suggests trend stationarity and neither indicates stationarity we 
will infer trend stationarity. Otherwise, we infer a unit root (please see the Appendix for a more 
detailed discussion of the procedure). 
We proceed to test for cointegration between 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡, 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡), 
and 𝑟𝑡 by applying Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration test, which is based on the 
following model assuming a single cointegrating vector:  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿1,𝑖 + 𝛿2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝀𝑖
′𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖




+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  (8) 
where, 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ = (𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡 𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡 … 𝑥𝐾,𝑖,𝑡) is a vector containing 𝐾 explanatory variables that are 
assumed to be weakly exogenous while the inclusion of 𝑞𝑖 lead values prevents the violation of 
strict exogeneity. The number of leads and lags is chosen to minimise Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) as implemented with Persyn and Westerlund’s (2008) Stata program. 
The null of no cointegration for any cross-sectional unit, 𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖 = 0 ∀ 𝑖, is tested against 
two different alternative hypotheses. The two group mean statistics, denoted 𝐺𝜏 and 𝐺𝛼, specify 
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the alternative as cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit: 𝐻1
𝐺: 𝛼𝑖 < 0, that is, for at 
least one 𝑖. 𝐺𝛼 utilises a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) adjustment 





, giving 𝑀𝑖 = 3.
19 The two panel 
statistics, denoted 𝑃𝜏 and 𝑃𝛼, specify the alternative hypothesis that there is cointegration for all 
cross-sectional units, that is, 𝐻1
𝑃: 𝛼𝑖 < 0 ∀ 𝑖.
20  
The Westerlund (2007) test assumes weak exogeneity and we asses this assumption by, 
firstly, applying the Westerlund (2007) test to the reverse regression of inequality on house 
prices.21 Furthermore, we use a more typical test for weak exogeneity that is based on the error-
correction form of a vector autoregression (VAR), typically referred to as the restricted vector 
error correction model (VECM) or VEC. The VEC, assuming one cointegrating equation with 
(unrestricted) intercept and no trend, in this two-variable system would be specified as follows 
for country 𝑖: 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) = 𝛾11 + ∑ 𝛾12𝑗∆ 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛾13𝑗∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡−𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛼1[𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡−1) − 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡−1]
∆ 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡 = 𝛾21 + ∑ 𝛾22𝑗∆ 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛾23𝑗∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡−𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛼2[𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡−1) − 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡−1]
     (9) 
When applying long-run Granger non-causality (LRGNC) tests we estimate system (9) for 
each country with time-series regressions, using previously specified cointegrating equations 
to define the error-correction terms.22 We subtract the mean of these error-correction terms to 
                                                 
19 We set the maximum number of lead and lags in (8) to 3.  
20 The four panel cointegration statistics are normalised using the asymptotic moments reported in Westerlund 
(2007, Table 1) and have an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Any normalised statistic that is less negative 
(greater) than the left-tail critical value implies that the no cointegration null should not be rejected. We report 
bootstrapped probability values (using 800 replications), that are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional 
dependence, as produced by Persyn and Westerlund’s (2008) program. We find that when cointegration is 
supported it is based on at least one of the panel statistics suggesting cointegration for the whole panel of countries. 
21 Please note that this method of assessing weak exogeneity is only suggestive because the cointegrating equations 
in the autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models are different when the difference of 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is the dependent 
variable and when the difference of inequality is the dependent variable; and because only leads and lags of the 
differenced regressors are included in the ADL model. 
22 The null of weak exogeneity uses t-tests on 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 with the following alternative hypotheses: 𝐻𝐴
1 : 𝛼1 ≠ 0 
implies that 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡 Granger-causes 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) in the long-run. 𝐻𝐴
2 : 𝛼2 ≠ 0 implies that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) Granger-causes 
 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡 in the long-run. LRGNC tests are only applied to models with evident cointegration because the error-
correction term will only be stationary if there is cointegration. Without cointegration, standard critical values used 
in the LRGNC tests are inappropriate due to a spurious significance problem (see Stewart, 2011). 
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produce new zero mean error-correction terms to be used in a slightly modified version of (9). 
The lag lengths for each country are determined using the AIC with a maximum lag of  𝑝 = 3. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
The panel unit root tests suggest that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) and our four inequality measures 
are at least I(1) for the vast majority of the 15 countries that are regarded as broadly 
homogeneous in terms of our analysis (see Appendix). To be more precise, according to at least 
one of the two test, the number of countries where the series are found to be I(1) are: 10 for 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), 13 for 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), 12 for 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡, 11 for 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡, 14 for 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡), and 13 for 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡).
23 
 That not all countries’ variables are I(1) may be due to factors such as Type I errors. Hence, 
we treat all series as if they are I(1), satisfying the necessary condition for cointegration, and 
proceed to conduct tests of cointegration.24 If the assumption that the necessary condition for 
cointegration being satisfied is incorrect this will likely manifest itself in the rejection of 
cointegration and/or the theoretical implausibility of the estimated cointegrating equation. 
We therefore proceed to test for bivariate cointegration between 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡 or 
𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) by applying Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration test (Table 3). For the two 
relative inequality measures, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 (columns 4-5), all four tests for both sets of 
deterministic terms cannot reject the null hypothesis. Hence, it is unambiguous that there is no 
evidence of cointegration between 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 or 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡. The same is broadly true for 
𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), where only one of the eight test suggests cointegration (column 6).  
𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡), on the other hand, pass all tests of cointegration but one (columns 
2-3). The evidence in favor of cointegration between these two variables and 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is 
                                                 
23 When considering the whole sample of 18 countries, the number that are found to be I(1) are: 13 for 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), 
16 for 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), 15 for 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 , 14 for 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 , 17 for 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡), and 16 for 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡). 
24 If some of the series are I(0) this should not be an issue because the ADL method can identify error-correction 
relationships when some series are I(1) and others are I(0), see Pesaran et al. (2001). 
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especially strong when the intercept is the only deterministic term included in the model, where 
all tests indicate cointegration at least at the 5%-level of significance. 
< Table 3 > 
Given the evidence in favor of cointegration with homogeneous long-run coefficients across 
all 15 countries for both absolute measures of inequality we report their implied estimated 
homogeneous long-run relationships in Table 4. We favor inference from the models where the 
intercept is the only deterministic term.25 In line with the results presented in Table 2 (Section 
3.1.2), in these long-run models the inequality measures are both significant (at the 1%-level) 
and exhibit the expected positive coefficient sign. Hence, it can be concluded that the two 
absolute inequality measures are an important correlate of house prices in this sample of 
countries. This finding is theoretically expected (as discussed in Section 2), and in line with the 
dynamic panel fixed-effects results. 
< Table 4 > 
The Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests on the reverse regression with inequality as 
the dependent variable regressed on 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) reject cointegration for all four inequality 
measures and 𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) regardless of the deterministic specification (Table 5). This suggests 
that inequality and real per capita income is weakly exogenous with respect to 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), and 
that the cointegration and dynamic panel fixed-effects results are not subject to low power due 
to the violation of weak exogeneity. A further implication of the suggestion of the two absolute 
measures of inequality (𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡)) being weakly exogenous with respect to 
                                                 
25 When both an intercept and trend are included in the model the trend term is not significant. This suggests that 
the trend term can be excluded from the long-run equation and that cointegrating equations including a trend should 
not be favoured. This is consistent with the model including both intercept and trend providing less support for 
cointegration than the model where the intercept is the only deterministic term and suggests that there are no 
omitted variables from the long-run equations that approximately follow a linear trend. 
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𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is that there is uni-directional long-run causality from absolute inequality to 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 
and no reverse causality in the opposite direction. 
< Table 5> 
The individual country probability values of t-tests for LRGNC based on time-series 
regressions (Table 6) confirm the above finding that for the majority of countries there is no 
evident violation of the weak exogeneity assumption. To be more precise, for nine of the 15 
countries there is evidence that, in the long-run, 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) and/or 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) Granger-causes 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) does not Granger-cause 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡). Moreover, it is important to note 
that for the six countries where the tests suggest a bi-directional long-run Granger-causality 
(CAN, IRE, NET, NEW, NOR, SPA), the hypothesis that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) Granger-causes 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) 
and/or 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) in most cases is accepted only at the 10%-level of significance. Hence, 
overall, the results indicate that the direction of causality is from absolute inequality to real 
house prices, and that the anomalies found may be due to small (time-series) sample effects and 
Type I errors. 
The finding that the increase in house prices seemingly has not contributed substantially to 
the increase in inequality probably can be ascribed to the fact that in most countries rent income 
has risen only slowly.26 In the USA, for example, rents remained flat during a period of 
sustained increases in house prices (Sommer et al., 2011; 2013); which explains why Mikhed 
and Zemcik (2009) find that US rents and house prices were not cointegrated during 1980-2008. 
The same seems to be true for most of the other sample countries, given that the average house 
price to rent ratio nearly doubled during 1975-2010 (OECD, 2018).27 
< Table 6 > 
                                                 
26 For EU countries the relatively low rent growth is explained mainly by strict rent controls (ECB, 2003). 
27 Please note that potential wealth or consumption effects (as discussed, for example, by Buiter (2010)) are not 
captured by the causality test on the grounds that the inequality variables used are based on income. 
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Finally, we consider whether these results stay robust when the real short-term interest rate 
(𝑟𝑡) and the population size (𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡)) are considered as additional covariates. First, we find 
that the interest rate series is unlikely to be cointegrated on its own with 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) because in 
many cases it has a different order of integration. While 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is at least I(1) for the majority 
of countries, 𝑟𝑡 is found to be I(0) in nine and I(1) in the remaining six countries.
28 
That the real interest is I(0) for many countries is consistent with the Fisher hypothesis, 
(Malliaropulos (2000), Costantini and Lupi (2007), Omay and Yuksel (2015), Panopoulou and 
Pantelidis (2016)). However, (𝑟𝑡) can still potentially form part of the cointegrating relationship 
with 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) when it is considered a covariate with another I(1) explanatory variable – see, for 
example, Pesaran et al. (2001) for a discussion of including I(0) and I(1) variables in an ADL 
model’s equilibrium. 
For all 15 countries the 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) series are indicted to be 𝐼(2).
29 While this suggests that 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) do not satisfy the necessary condition for cointegration we consider the 
possibility that any series indicated to be 𝐼(1) is actually 𝐼(1) around structural breaks and 
therefore can potentially cointegrate. This possibility is considered because of the well-known 
lack of power of unit root tests and to ensure that this theoretically postulated determinant of 
house prices is not neglected in our analysis. If the assumption that the necessary condition for 
cointegration being satisfied is incorrect this will likely be manifest in our tests rejecting 
cointegration and/or making the estimated cointegrating equations theoretically implausible. 
Table 7 reports Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration tests for trivariate regressions of 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 
on 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) on 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) and 𝑟𝑡; and four-variable regressions of 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 
on 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡), and 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) on 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡). The results 
unambiguously indicate no evident cointegration for the models involving the two relative 
                                                 
28 For the n=18 sample, 𝑟𝑡 is I(0) for eleven countries and I(1) for the remaining seven countries. 
29  The same is true for the n=18 sample. 
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inequality variables (columns 5-6). With one exception, the same is true for the mean income 
variable (last column).  
The only two variables of interest that demonstrate evidence favoring cointegration in the 
house price equation (with 𝑟𝑡 and/or 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡)) are 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝$𝑡). Especially 
in the case of 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝$𝑡) this evidence is less robust than in the bivariate regressions but, 
potentially, this can be explained by the reduced efficiency due to increased covariates that raise 
(lower) the coefficient standard error (t-ratio) of the adjustment coefficient upon which the 
cointegration tests are based.  
Nevertheless, although they should be treated with caution due to the small time-series 
dimension available and the leads and lags used, the results of Table 7 can be interpreted as 
being consistent and confirming of our bivariate cointegration analysis. That is to say, the 
presented evidence is suggestive that 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝$𝑡) form cointegrating equations 
with house prices in 15 OECD countries. 
< Table 7 > 
4. Conclusions 
Our results provide two novel insights. First, increasing income inequality contributed to the 
rise in real house prices in 15 OECD countries during the period 1975-2010. Second, the results 
are sensitive to the use of relative and absolute inequality measures. 
To be more specific, the presented results indicate that the income variance and the market 
income of the Top 5% form cointegrating equations with house prices (with a uni-directional 
causality from inequality to house prices), and that they are significant positive correlates of 
house prices. The short-term real interest rate also shows some evidence of being a significant 
long-run determinant, whereas relative inequality and mean income do not show any signs of 
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long-run correlation or cointegration with house prices. The finding that the rise in mean income 
was not a main driver behind the long-run increase in house prices is surprising, but it is in line 
with some previous studies (e.g., Gallin, 2006; Mikhed and Zemcik, 2009; Knoll et al., 2017). 
While it is important to note that the strong correlation between GDP per capita and absolute 
inequality makes it somewhat difficult to disentangle the effects of these two variables, overall, 
the results suggest that the surge in OECD house prices in part can be explained by a top-
income-induced increase in housing demand, and that it is important to consider the interaction 
of rising mean income and its relative distribution when studying potential correlates of house 
prices.  
This finding not only contributes to a growing literature that argues that the recent inequality 
increase in developed countries has important socio-economic effects (see e.g., OECD, 2015), 
but moreover suggests that the current focus on relative inequality measures is unduly 
restrictive and that future research should give more attention to alternative inequality measures 
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Table 1: Dynamic panel fixed-effects estimator regressions for 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕) 































































































































Table notes: The sample comprises 15 OECD countries (see Section 3.1.1 for details). The first column denotes 
the potential correlates of house prices that are considered in the regressions, while the first row clarifies the 
INEQ measure involved. T-ratios are given in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote rejection of the non-




Table 2: Dynamic panel fixed-effects estimator regressions for 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕), considering 
multicollinearity issues  
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Table notes: See notes to Table 1, except the first row denotes the measure involved and the variable omitted in 




Table 3: Robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration tests of 
𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕) on 𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒕 or 𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕) 𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$𝒕) 𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓%𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕) 
Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend 
𝐺𝜏 0.001
*** 0.013** 0.005*** 0.053* 0.964 0.321 0.981 0.330 0.434 0.980 
𝐺𝛼 0.014
** 0.037** 0.031** 0.114 0.865 0.133 0.925 0.121 0.186 0.700 
𝑃𝜏 0.000
*** 0.014** 0.001*** 0.059* 0.424 0.174 0.445 0.159 0.205 0.868 
𝑃𝛼 0.001
*** 0.084* 0.004*** 0.089* 0.413 0.308 0.409 0.240 0.011** 0.753 
Leads 1.27 1.47 1.27 1.60 1.33 1.20 1.33 1.20 1.60 1.40 
Lags 1.13 1.27 1.13 1.33 1.07 1.07 1.13 1.07 1.27 1.27 
Table notes: The first row denotes the measure involved in the potential cointegrating equation with 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) as 
the dependent variable. The second row specifies the deterministic terms included in the cointegration equation 
as Int when only an intercept is included and Trend when both an intercept and trend are included. 𝐺𝜏 and 𝐺𝛼  
denote the tests when the alternative hypothesis is that there is cointegration for at least one country in the panel. 
𝑃𝜏 and 𝑃𝛼 denote the tests when the alternative hypothesis is that there is cointegration for all countries in the 
panel. All four tests are based on either OLS or heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
coefficient standard errors, respectively. The average number of leads and lags (selected with the AIC) used in the 
countries’ error-correction models are specified in the rows labelled Leads and Lags, respectively. A maximum of 
3 leads and lags are allowed. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the non-cointegration null at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Table 4: Estimated panel long-run relationship and short-run adjustment for 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕) 
 𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕) 𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$𝒕) 


































Table notes: See notes to Table 3. The estimated long-run coefficients, with t-ratios given in parentheses, are 




Table 5: Robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration tests of 
𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒕 or 𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕) on 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕) 𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$𝒕) 𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓%𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕) 
Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend 
𝐺𝜏 1.000 0.424 1.000 0.325 0.550 0.140
 0.556 0.251 1.000 0.616 
𝐺𝛼 1.000 0.334 1.000 0.193 0.811 0.593 0.825 0.677 1.000 0.866 
𝑃𝜏 0.984 0.771 0.973 0.719 0.435 0.430 0.461 0.439 0.971 0.995 
𝑃𝛼 0.981 0.705 0.971 0.666 0.413 0.520 0.459 0.547 0.976 0.980 
Leads 1.47 1.40 1.20 1.27 1.07 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.07 1.60 
Lags 0.87 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.73 
Table notes: See notes to Table 3 except the first row denotes the inequality measure that is the dependent variable 
in the potential cointegrating equation with 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) as the regressor. 
 
Table 6: Time-series long-run GNC tests  











AUS 2 0.033** 0.142 3 0.072* 0.438 
BEL 1 0.007*** 0.425 1 0.007*** 0.270 
CAN 3 0.002*** 0.033** 3 0.001*** 0.066* 
DEN 1 0.014** 0.987 1 0.013** 0.850 
FIN 1 0.003*** 0.805 1 0.003*** 0.628 
FRA 1 0.008*** 0.445 1 0.011** 0.479 
IRE 2 0.058* 0.075* 2 0.059* 0.062* 
ITA 2 0.000*** 0.644 2 0.000*** 0.632 
NET 1 0.006*** 0.082* 1 0.003*** 0.105 
NEW 1 0.013** 0.009*** 1 0.023** 0.003*** 
NOR 1 0.015** 0.083* 1 0.017** 0.050* 
SPA 1 0.112 0.050* 1 0.079* 0.046** 
SWE 1 0.003*** 0.470 3 0.139 0.840 
UKD 1 0.021** 0.438 1 0.020** 0.539 
USA 3 0.014** 0.982 3 0.008*** 0.804 
Table notes: The probability value of a t-test on the error-correction term are reported. Lag denotes the VAR lag 
length chosen according to AIC criterion. 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑡  to 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) refers to tests of the respective measure of inequality 




Table 7: Robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) test of 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝑷𝒕) on 𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒕 or 
𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕), considering 𝒓𝒕 and 𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒐𝒑)𝒕 as additional covariates 
 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕) 𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$𝒕) 𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓%𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕) 
Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend 
𝒓𝒕 
𝐺𝜏 0.195 0.486 0.428 0.894 0.946 0.964 0.996 0.966 0.495 0.834 
𝐺𝛼 0.034** 0.035** 0.556 0.934 0.848 0.476 0.961 0.460 0.510 0.960 
𝑃𝜏 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.176 0.630 0.203 0.358 0.835 0.393 0.118 0.625 
𝑃𝛼 0.058* 0.035** 0.180 0.325 0.260 0.401 0.893 0.516 0.131 0.669 
Leads 1.80 2.07 1.60 1.93 2.07 2.07 2.00 2.20 2.53 2.53 




𝐺𝜏 0.088* 0.367 0.088* 0.273 0.285 0.733 0.208 0.764 0.373 0.516 
𝐺𝛼 0.019** 0.013** 0.034** 0.013** 0.953 0.999 0.873 1.000 0.660 0.285 
𝑃𝜏 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.865 0.999 0.591 0.999 0.113 0.064* 
𝑃𝛼 0.129 0.106 0.128 0.095* 0.845 1.000 0.639 1.000 0.424 0.318 
Leads 1.53 1.67 1.67 1.60 1.33 1.40 1.27 1.40 1.47 1.67 
Lags 1.53 1.73 1.73 1.60 1.33 1.73 1.33 1.73 1.27 1.60 
Table notes: See notes to Table 3, except the first column denotes the additional covariates involved in the potential 




Figure 1: Absolute inequality: the interaction between relative income distribution and 
mean income 
 
Note: This graph shows the income of the bottom and top earners of three fictitious countries. The countries differ 
in their relative income distribution (top income share) and/or mean income. The mean income of A is $5,000, 
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Note: The graphs show the evolution of the logarithm of real house prices (RHP, left axis) and the logarithm of 























































































































































































































Note: The graphs show the evolution of the logarithm of real house prices (RHP, left axis) and the Gini coefficient 







Table A1: Correlation matrix of variables 
 𝒍𝒏 (𝑯𝑷) 𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓) 𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$) 𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓% 𝒍𝒏 (𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄) 𝒓 𝒍𝒏 (𝑷𝒐𝒑) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝑯𝑷) 1        
𝒍𝒏(𝑽𝒂𝒓) 0.726 1       
𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓$) 0.652 0.922 1      
𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊 0.406 0.681 0.572 1     
𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟓% 0.399 0.675 0.567 0.997 1    
𝒍𝒏 (𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄) 0.535 0.740 0.866 0.135 0.127 1   
𝒓 -0.103 0.081 0.102 0.092 0.082 0.110 1  
𝒍𝒏 (𝑷𝒐𝒑) 0.226 0.284 0.041 0.312 0.312 -0.132 -0.074 1 
 
 
Unit Root Test procedure and results 
To establish the (non-)stationarity of the data the unit root tests of Pesaran (2007) and Cerrato 
et al. (2009, 2011) are used. Pesaran’s (2007) test assumes linear adjustment, can deal with 
cross-sectional dependence and is based upon the following time-series regression estimated 





𝑃 ?̅?𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑗
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𝑃   (1A) 











The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root for all cross-sectional units, 𝑏𝑖
𝑃 = 0 ∀ 𝑖 while 
the alternative is that 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is stationary for at least one cross-section,  𝑏𝑖
𝑃 < 0 for at least one 𝑖. 














𝑃(𝑁, 𝑇)𝑁𝑖=1   (2A) 
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The version of the test that we use, following the scheme given in Pesaran (2007) and 
denoted 𝑡𝑖





𝑃∗(𝑁, 𝑇)𝑁𝑖=1   (3A) 
 
Cerrato et al.’s (2009, 2011) heterogeneous nonlinear panel unit root tests involves 
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𝐶   (4A) 
where, 𝑦𝑡−1





𝑖=1 . A time trend, 𝑡, is included following Cerrato et al. (2013) and 
the lag length, 𝑝𝑖, can be determined using information criteria.  
The null hypothesis is 𝑏𝑖
𝐶 = 0 ∀ 𝑖, while the alternative is 𝑏𝑖
𝐶 < 0 for at least one 𝑖. The t-








𝐶 is the OLS estimate of 𝑏𝑖
𝐶 and 
𝑠?̂?𝑖






𝐶(𝑁, 𝑇)𝑁𝑖=1   (5A) 
If the test-statistic is not more negative than the critical value, reported in Cerrato et al. (2009 
and 2011), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Simulations indicate that this test has superior 
size and power than Pesaran’s (2007) test when the data generating process is nonlinear. 
For both panel unit root tests, the sequential panel selection method (SPSM), proposed by 
Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009), is applied to identify which cross-sections (countries) are 
stationary and which are nonstationary30. The null hypothesis is that all countries’ series are 
I(1) and the alternative is that at least one country’s series is I(0). 
                                                 
30 Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009) apply the SPSM procedure to the Im et al. (2003) panel unit root test that 
does not account for cross-sectional dependence. 
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The SPSM essentially involves applying the panel unit root test to all 𝑁 countries. For 
illustration we discuss the SPSM using the Cerrato et al.’s (2009, 2011) test although a similar 
procedure is also applied to the Pearan (2007) method. The Cerrato et al. (2009, 2011) test-
statistic for all N countries is denoted 𝑡̅(𝑁, 𝑇), and if the null cannot be rejected the procedure 
stops and all countries’ series are I(1). However, if the null hypothesis is rejected at least one 
country’s series is I(0) and we exclude the country that rejects the I(1) null the most, which is 
the one that has the smallest (most negative) individual country test-statistic, 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑡𝑖
𝐶(𝑁, 𝑇)}. 
The panel unit root test-statistic is calculated for the remaining 𝑁 − 1 countries, denoted 
𝑡̅(𝑁 − 1, 𝑇). The test is repeated for the remaining countries and the process continues until the 
panel unit root test cannot reject the null. All countries’ series included in the last test are I(1) 
and all countries’ series excluded from the last test are I(0). 
To finally determine which series is stationary, trend-stationary or nonstationary we use the 
following procedure: if the unit root null is rejected using the test including only an intercept as 
a deterministic term the series is stationary. However, if the null is not rejected, the unit root 
test including both an intercept and trend is considered. If the null of this test is rejected the 
series is trend stationary, whereas if the null is not rejected the series has a unit root.31  
Table A2 reports Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test using the SPSM procedure applied to 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡, 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡, 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡), 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡), 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡), 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) and 𝑟𝑡. The null 
hypothesis that all 18 countries’ series in the panel are 𝐼(1) cannot be rejected for all variables, 
except 𝑟𝑡, regardless of the deterministic specification of the test equations. In the case of 𝑟𝑡, 7 
countries’ series are I(0) around a constant mean (BEL, CAN, ITA, KOR, NET, SPA and 
                                                 
31 We only identify a series as trend stationary when the null of I(1) is being tested and not when the null is for an 
I(2) process because the latter involves a test on the differenced series and differencing should remove any (linear) 
trend in a series. Any structural breaks in the differenced series are likely to be mean shifts rather than changing 
slopes in trend. 
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SWE), no countries’ series are trend stationary and the 11 remaining countries’ series are at 
least I(1).  
Table A2: Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test applied to levels data with the SPSM 
procedure 
  Intercept only Intercept and trend 
Variable N Statistic 5% critical Statistic 5% critical 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 18 -2.563 -3.336 -2.780 -3.857 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 18 -2.530 -3.335 -3.064 -3.855 
𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡  18 -2.491 -3.335 -2.987 -3.855 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡)  18 -2.720 -3.334 -2.790 -3.855 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) 18 -2.520 -3.334 -2.634 -3.855 
𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) 18 -2.312 -3.335 -2.411 -3.855 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) 18 -1.657 -3.338 -1.682 -3.860 
 Country excluded Variable: 𝑟𝑡 
SPA/SPA 18 -3.979** -3.335 -4.298** -3.857 
SWE/CAN 17 -3.895** -3.339 -4.201** -3.858 
CAN/BEL 16 -3.785** -3.344 -4.060** -3.860 
KOR/SWE 15 -3.597** -3.347 -3.878** -3.861 
ITA/ITA 14 -3.579** -3.347 -3.860** -3.859 
BEL/None 13 -3.502** -3.346 -3.842 -3.858 
NET/None 12 -3.362** -3.345   
None/None 11 -3.227 -3.344   
Table notes. The column headed Variable indicates the variable that the tests are applied to and the column headed 
N denotes the number of countries included in the panel unit root tests. The tests are applied with two sets of 
deterministic terms being only an intercept (reported in the column headed Intercept only) and an intercept and 
trend (reported in the column headed Intercept and trend). The truncated panel unit root test-statistics (CIPS) are 
reported in the columns headed Statistic while the corresponding 5% critical value (interpolated from those 
reported in Pesaran, 2007, and those for a standard ADF test when N=1) are given in the columns headed 5% 
critical. ** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis that all the countries’ series in the panel are 𝐼(1) at the 
5% level. When the null hypothesis is rejected the first column, headed Country excluded, gives the three letter 
country identifier for the country to be excluded from the next test in the SPSM sequence. The first country specified 
is for the Intercept only case and the second country identifier is given for the Intercept and trend case. 
Table A3 reports Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test using the SPSM procedure applied to 
the first difference of the variables tested in Table A2. The unit root test results based upon the 
Pesaran (2007) method suggest that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is at least 𝐼(2) for all countries except UKD, where 
it is 𝐼(1). In contrast, the inequality measures are 𝐼(1) for most (13 to 15) nations and 𝐼(2) for 
the remaining (3 to 5) states.32 For 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) 7 countries’ series are I(1) (AUS, BEL, DEN, 
                                                 
32 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡  is 𝐼(1) for 13 countries (CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE and the 
USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 5 countries (AUS, BEL, IRE, SPA and UKD). 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 is 𝐼(1) for 13 countries (CAN, 
DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE and the USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 5 countries 
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ITA, KOR, UKD and the USA) and the 11 remaining countries’ series are at least I(2). All 18 
nations series are 𝐼(2) for 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡). Since ∆𝑟𝑡 is stationary for all countries, 𝑟𝑡 is I(0) around a 
constant mean for 7 countries’ series (BEL, CAN, ITA, KOR, NET, SPA and SWE), no nations’ 
series are trend stationary and the 11 remaining countries’ series are I(1). 
Table A3: Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test applied to differenced data with the 
SPSM procedure 
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 





Country excluded Statistic 5% 
critical 
18 UKD -3.369** -3.337 None -3.728 -3.859 
17 None -3.230 -3.341    
Variable: ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
18 GER -4.891** -3.337 GER -5.215** -3.858 
17 KOR -4.775** -3.341 FIN -4.974** -3.860 
16 FRA -4.679** -3.345 KOR -4.923** -3.860 
15 FIN -4.466** -3.348 FRA -4.821** -3.862 
14 JAP -4.293** -3.348 NEW -4.697** -3.861 
13 SWE -4.162** -3.347 JAP -4.551** -3.859 
12 CAN -4.285** -3.347 SWE -4.424** -3.857 
11 NEW -4.165** -3.346 CAN -4.231** -3.854 
10 NOR -3.986** -3.346 NOR -4.107** -3.852 
9 USA -3.822** -3.303 USA -3.975** -3.819 
8 ITA -3.707** -3.259 UKD -3.855** -3.786 
7 NET -3.572** -3.216 None -3.686 -3.753 
6 DEN -3.512** -3.172    
5 None -3.124 -3.129    
Variable: ∆𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 
18 GER -5.072** -3.336 GER -5.058** -3.858 
17 KOR -4.734** -3.340 FRA -4.871** -3.860 
16 FRA -4.633** -3.344 FIN -4.770** -3.862 
15 FIN -4.493** -3.348 NEW -4.635** -3.863 
14 CAN -4.320** -3.348 CAN -4.553** -3.862 
13 JAP -4.206** -3.347 AUS -4.460** -3.860 
12 SWE -4.069** -3.347 ITA -4.388** -3.857 
11 USA -4.156** -3.346 DEN -4.268** -3.855 
10 NOR -4.073** -3.346 USA -4.198** -3.853 
9 NEW -3.906** -3.303 UKD -4.034** -3.820 
8 ITA -3.741** -3.259 NOR -3.937** -3.788 
7 NET -3.576** -3.216 KOR -3.825** -3.755 
6 DEN -3.515** -3.172 None -3.687 -3.720 
5 None -3.099 -3.129    
 
                                                 
(AUS, BEL, IRE, SPA and UKD). 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 15 countries (BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, 
ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE and USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 3 countries (AUS, SPA and UKD). 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 15 countries (BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, 
SWE and the USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 3 countries (AUS, SPA and UKD). 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) 









18 FIN -5.180** -3.336 FIN -5.258** -3.857 
17 GER -5.075** -3.340 GER -5.191** -3.859 
16 FRA -4.972** -3.344 FRA -4.963** -3.861 
15 NEW -4.786** -3.349 NEW -4.876** -3.863 
14 JAP -4.748** -3.349 DEN -4.842** -3.862 
13 SWE -4.648** -3.348 USA -4.683** -3.860 
12 NOR -4.584** -3.347 KOR -4.631** -3.858 
11 KOR -4.575** -3.347 IRE -4.534** -3.856 
10 ITA -4.413** -3.347 JAP -4.445** -3.854 
9 IRE -4.230** -3.304 SWE -4.238** -3.820 
8 NET -4.104** -3.260 NET -4.158** -3.786 
7 CAN -4.044** -3.217 NOR -4.043** -3.753 
6 USA -4.006** -3.174 None -3.699 -3.721 
5 BEL -4.015** -3.131    
4 DEN -3.880** -3.087    
3 None -2.949 -3.042    
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) 
18 FIN -5.154** -3.336 FIN -5.230** -3.857 
17 GER -5.046** -3.340 GER -5.159** -3.859 
16 FRA -4.944** -3.344 FRA -5.050** -3.860 
15 NEW -4.764** -3.348 DEN -4.867** -3.863 
14 DEN -4.631** -3.348 NEW -4.657** -3.861 
13 KOR -4.557** -3.348 KOR -4.597** -3.859 
12 ITA -4.508** -3.348 USA -4.548** -3.857 
11 NET -4.479** -3.346 ITA -4.478** -3.855 
10 IRE -4.429** -3.346 NET -4.467** -3.852 
9 JAP -4.349** -3.303 IRE -4.394** -3.819 
8 SWE -4.160** -3.259 BEL -4.324** -3.786 
7 CAN -3.845** -3.216 SWE -4.282** -3.753 
6 NOR -3.691** -3.172 JAP -4.107** -3.720 
5 BEL -3.442** -3.129 None -3.669 -3.687 
4 USA -3.122** -3.086    
3 None -2.753 -3.042    
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) 
18 BEL -4.108** -3.336 BEL -4.278** -3.858 
17 AUS -4.005** -3.340 AUS -4.145** -3.860 
16 UKD -3.861** -3.344 ITA -3.971** -3.861 
15 DEN -3.773** -3.348 UKD -3.919** -3.863 
14 ITA -3.751** -3.348 DEN -3.863** -3.860 
13 USA -3.682** -3.347 None -3.826 -3.858 
12 KOR -3.575** -3.347    
11 None -3.315 -3.346    
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) 





Table A3 (continued) 
Variable: ∆𝒓𝒕 





Country excluded Statistic 5% 
critical 
18 SWE -5.813** -3.338 SWE -5.815** -3.860 
17 NEW -5.762** -3.342 NEW -5.802** -3.862 
16 SPA -5.749** -3.346 SPA -5.792** -3.863 
15 DEN -5.672** -3.350 UKD -5.699** -3.865 
14 UKD -5.725** -3.349 DEN -5.752** -3.863 
13 NOR -5.694** -3.349 NOR -5.716** -3.861 
12 CAN -5.597** -3.349 CAN -5.573** -3.859 
11 AUS -5.540** -3.348 AUS -5.509** -3.856 
10 IRE -5.510** -3.347 IRE -5.461** -3.854 
9 JAP -5.416** -3.305 JAP -5.293** -3.822 
8 KOR -5.317** -3.262 KOR -5.189** -3.789 
7 NET -5.140** -3.217 NET -5.023** -3.754 
6 FRA -4.894** -3.174 FRA -4.820** -3.723 
5 USA -4.678** -3.130 FIN -4.541** -3.689 
4 GER -4.901** -3.086 GER -4.537** -3.655 
3 FIN -4.873** -3.043 USA -4.584** -3.621 
2 ITA -4.309** -2.999 ITA -4.234** -3.588 
1 BEL -7.014** -2.951 BEL -7.290** -3.548 
Table notes. See Table A2 notes except the column headed Country excluded indicates a country’s series identified 
as not rejecting the unit root null. An entry of “None” in this column means that the unit root null cannot be 
rejected for all N remaining countries included in the panel unit root test. 
The results based on the Pesaran (2007) test suggest that the necessary condition for 
cointegration between 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) and all of the inequality measures as well as 𝑟𝑡 is violated for 
most countries. However, given that we expect 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) to be 𝐼(1) we consider the possibility 
that this result is due to low power (possibly due to structural breaks) and, in our cointegration 
analysis, we treat 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), and all measures of inequality, as if they are 𝐼(1) for all countries.
33 
If 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is 𝐼(2) for most countries it will not cointegrate with the generally 𝐼(1) inequality 
variables for those countries and our cointegration test results will reveal this.  
Similarly, the finding that many [all] countries’ 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) [𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) ] series are at least 
I(2) may also be due to structural breaks and we consider the possibility that this [these] series 
is [are] I(1) in our cointegration analysis. Further, 𝑟𝑡 being I(0) for many countries and no more 
                                                 
33 It may be that for some countries both 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃) and the inequality variable are found to be 𝐼(2) according to our 
test results and in fact are both 𝐼(1) around structural breaks and they are found to cointegrate because they 
cointegrate and co-break. 
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than I(1) for any country suggests that it is unlikely to cointegrate with 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), on its own, for 
many nations. However, when we apply unit root tests that allow for nonlinear adjustment we 
find far more widespread evidence that most countries’ series are I(1) according to at least one 
test, and this therefore helps support our treatment of the series (except interest rates) as 
satisfying the necessary condition for cointegration. The results from these nonlinear unit root 
tests are presented and discussed below. 
Table A4 reports Cerrato et al.’s (2011) heterogeneous nonlinear panel unit root tests (using 
the SPSM procedure) for the levels of the variables tested above. This test accommodates cross-
sectional dependence and extends the Pesaran et al. (2007) method that assumes a linear 
adjustment process by allowing nonlinear adjustment. Such nonlinear adjustment could look 
like structural breaks without being confined to a single once-and-for-all jump at one particular 
point in time. Hence, when there is such nonlinear adjustment Cerrato et al.’s (2011) test should 
be more powerful than that of Pesaran (2007). 
The results reported in Table A4 indicate that all series are at least I(1) for all countries 
except for 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡), where there is evidence of stationarity for 3 countries (FIN, JAP and NEW), 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 where there is evidence of stationarity for 1 country (NET) and 𝑟𝑡 where there is evidence 
of stationarity for 8 countries (BEL, FIN, GER, ITA, NEW, NOR, SPA and SWE) and trend 
stationarity for 1 country (CAN). Excepting these minor anomalies (that may be due to, for 
example, Type I errors) these results broadly confirm those from Pesaran’s (2007) test that all 




Table A4: Cerrato et al.’s (2011) nonlinear panel unit root test applied to levels data 
with SPSM 
Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 









18 NEW -2.385** -2.021 None -2.263 -2.379 
17 JAP -2.151** -2.027    
16 FIN -2.040** -2.033    
15 None -1.864 -2.039    
Variable: 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
18 NET -2.113** -2.023 None -2.102 -2.380 
17 None -1.810 -2.029    
Variable: 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 
18 None -2.014 -2.023 None -2.119 -2.381 
Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) 
18 None -1.922 -2.024 None -1.888 -2.381 
Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) 
18 None -1.940 -2.024 None -2.036 -2.381 
Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) 
18 None -1.453 -2.023 None -1.880 -2.381 
Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) 
18 None -1.799 -2.020 None -1.235 -2.377 
Variable:  𝑟𝑡 
18 NEW -2.822** -2.023 NEW -2.981** -2.381 
17 FIN -2.772** -2.030 FIN -2.841** -2.377 
16 SPA -2.426** -2.036 CAN -2.650** -2.373 
15 GER -2.709** -2.042 ITA -2.463** -2.370 
14 BEL -2.587** -2.048 None -2.337 -2.366 
13 SWE -2.456** -2.055    
12 NOR -2.450** -2.060    
11 ITA -2.144** -2.066    
10 None -2.002 -2.072    
Table notes. See Table A3 notes except critical values are interpolated from those reported in Cerrato et al. (2011), 
Table 13 and Table 14, as well as Cerrato et al. (2013). 
 
Table A5 reports Cerrato et al.’s (2011) heterogeneous nonlinear panel unit root test using 
the SPSM procedure applied to the first difference of the variables tested in Table A4. The unit 
root test results based upon the Cerrato et al.’s (2011) method suggest that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is 𝐼(0) 
around a constant mean for 3 countries (FIN, JAP, NEW), trend stationary for 0 countries, 𝐼(1) 
for 12 countries (AUS, CAN, DEN, GER, ITA, KOR, NET, NOR, SPA, SWE, UKD and the 
USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 3 countries (BEL, FRA and IRE). Similarly, the inequality measures 
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are 𝐼(1) for most (9 to 15) nations and 𝐼(1) for the remaining states.34 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) is 𝐼(0) 
around a constant mean for 0 countries, trend stationary for 0 countries, 𝐼(1) for 16 countries 
(AUS, BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, SPA, SWE, UKD and 
the USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 2 countries (NEW and NOR). All 18 nations series are 𝐼(2) for 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡). 𝑟𝑡 is I(0) around a constant mean for 8 countries’ series (BEL, FIN, GER, ITA, NEW, 
NOR, SPA and SWE), trend stationary for 1 country (CAN), I(1) for 4 countries (AUS, FRA, 
IRE and JAP) and at least 𝐼(2) for 5 countries (DEN, KOR, NET, UKD and the USA). 
Considering both panel unit root tests (allowing for both linear and nonlinear adjustment) 
we favour a lower order of integration if either test indicates a lower order because this is likely 
to reflect a test’s greater power when the correct form of alternative hypothesis is specified. 
Further, we reject a finding that either 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) or 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) is I(0) because in the growing 
and inflationary economies that we consider we believe it is unrealistic to regard either of these 
series as anything other than nonstationary. Combining these prior beliefs with our unit root 
tests we argue that all series are 𝐼(1) for the vast majority of countries (with the exception of 
interest rates where 11 countries’ series are I(0) and 7 are I(1)).35 Further, any anomalies may 
                                                 
34 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡  is 𝐼(0) around a constant mean for 1 country (NET), trend stationary for 0 countries, 𝐼(1) for 12 countries 
(AUS, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE, JAP, NEW, NOR, SWE, UKD and the USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 5 countries 
(BEL, GER, ITA, KOR and SPA). 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 is 𝐼(1) for 13 countries (CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, 
JAP, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE and the USA) and at least 𝐼(2) for 5 countries (AUS, BEL, KOR, SPA and UKD). 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 9 countries (CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, IRE, NEW, NOR, SPA and UKD) and at least 𝐼(2) for 
9 countries (AUS, BEL, GER, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, SWE and the USA). 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 15 countries 
(BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NEW, NOR, SWE, UKD and the USA) and at least 
𝐼(2) for 3 countries (AUS, NET and SPA). 
35 Hence, our findings are that 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 13 countries (AUS, CAN, DEN, GER, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, 
NOR, SPA, SWE, UKD and the USA) and for the 5 countries (BEL, FIN, FRA, NEW and IRE) where it is found 
to be at least 𝐼(2) we consider the possibility that it is 𝐼(1) around structural breaks. Similarly, 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡) is 
𝐼(1) for 16 countries (AUS, BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, SPA, SWE, UKD 
and the USA) and for the 2 countries (NEW and NOR) where it is found to be at least 𝐼(2) we consider the 
possibility it is 𝐼(1) around structural breaks. Although 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡  is evidently 𝐼(0) for 1 country (NET) we consider 
the possibility that this is due to anomalies such as such as Type I errors and treat it as 𝐼(1) for this country. 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡  
is 𝐼(1) according to at least one of the tests for another 15 countries (AUS, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, 
ITA, JAP, KOR, NEW, NOR, SWE, UKD and the USA), and for the 2 countries (BEL, and SPA) where it is found 
to be at least 𝐼(2) we consider the possibility it is 𝐼(1) around structural breaks. 𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡 is 𝐼(1) for 14 countries 
(CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE and the USA), and for the 4 
countries (AUS, BEL, SPA and UKD) where it is found to be at least 𝐼(2) we consider the possibility it is 𝐼(1) 
around structural breaks. 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 17 countries (BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, 
KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SPA, SWE, UKD and the USA), and for the 1 country (AUS) where it is found to be at 
least 𝐼(2) we consider the possibility it is 𝐼(1) around structural breaks. 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) is 𝐼(1) for 16 countries (BEL, 
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be due to factors such as Type I errors. Hence, we treat all series as if they are I(1), satisfying 
the necessary condition for cointegration, and proceed to conduct tests of cointegration.36 If the 
assumption that the necessary condition for cointegration being satisfied is incorrect this will 
likely be manifest in our tests rejecting cointegration (the most likely series where this could be 
the case is the real interest rate) and/or making the estimated cointegrating equations 
theoretically implausible.  
  
                                                 
CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, IRE, ITA, JAP, KOR, NET, NEW, NOR, SWE, UKD and the USA), and for the 2 
countries (AUS and SPA) where it is found to be at least 𝐼(2) we consider the possibility it is 𝐼(1) around structural 
breaks. All 18 nations series are 𝐼(2) for 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡), however, we consider the possibility that it is 𝐼(1) around 
structural breaks for all countries. 𝑟𝑡 is I(0) for 11 countries’ series (BEL, CAN, FIN, GER, ITA, KOR, NET, 
NEW, NOR, SPA and SWE) and I(1) for 7 countries (AUS, DEN, FRA, IRE, JAP, UKD and the USA). While we 
consider the possibility that  𝑟𝑡 is I(1) for all countries we recognize that it may well be I(0) for most countries and, 
as for any other cases where the treatment of a series as I(1) turns out to be incorrect, we believe that this will 
likely become apparent from the cointegration test results and the theoretical plausibility of the estimated 
cointegrating equations (which will likely to cause us to reject such specifications). 
36 If some of the series are I(0) this should not be an issue because the ADL method can identify error-correction 
relationships when some series are I(1) and others are I(0) – although the critical values employed with the 
Westerlund (2007) method assume I(1) variables. Further, if some series are trend stationary this can be accounted 
for in our application of the Westerlund (2007) procedure because we apply the method incorporating just an 
intercept and both an intercept and linear trend. 
49 
 
Table A5: Cerrato et al.’s (2011) nonlinear panel unit root test applied to difference data 
with SPSM 
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑃𝑡) 









18 NET -3.212** -2.021 JAP -3.524** -2.377 
17 JAP -3.001** -2.027 NET -3.345** -2.373 
16 SWE -2.882** -2.033 DEN -3.176** -2.369 
15 KOR -2.712** -2.039 SWE -2.963** -2.366 
14 NOR -2.692** -2.045 NOR -2.757** -2.362 
13 DEN -2.700** -2.050 AUS -2.843** -2.358 
12 AUS -2.462** -2.057 KOR -2.707** -2.354 
11 ITA -2.449** -2.063 ITA -2.614** -2.351 
10 UKD -2.332** -2.070 USA -2.614** -2.351 
9 GER -2.343** -2.076 UKD -2.408** -2.343 
8 USA -2.278** -2.082 GER -2.504** -2.340 
7 CAN -2.226** -2.088 CAN -2.393** -2.336 
6 SPA -2.151** -2.094 None -2.326 -2.332 
5 None -1.890 -2.100    
Variable: ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡  
18 NOR -3.727** -2.021 NOR -3.904** -2.378 
17 NEW -3.659** -2.027 NEW -3.709** -2.374 
16 UKD -3.614** -2.034 UKD -3.632** -2.371 
15 FRA -3.424** -2.040 FRA -3.409** -2.367 
14 FIN -3.285** -2.045 FIN -3.276** -2.363 
13 CAN -3.073** -2.051 CAN -3.071** -2.359 
12 JAP -2.904** -2.057 IRE -2.912** -2.355 
11 NET -2.848** -2.063 JAP -2.804** -2.351 
10 SWE -2.715** -2.069 NET -2.881** -2.347 
9 IRE -2.732** -2.075 SWE -2.728** -2.343 
8 DEN -2.618** -2.081 DEN -2.575** -2.339 
7 USA -2.319** -2.087 None -2.281 -2.335 
6 AUS -2.241** -2.093    




Table A5 (continued) 
Variable: ∆𝑇𝑜𝑝5%𝑡  









17 NOR -3.550** -2.027 NOR -3.595** -2.374 
16 CAN -3.417** -2.033 NEW -3.468** -2.370 
15 FRA -3.299** -2.039 CAN -3.351** -2.367 
14 FIN -3.181** -2.045 FIN -3.214** -2.363 
13 NEW -2.935** -2.051 FRA -2.973** -2.359 
12 NET -2.769** -2.057 NET -2.785** -2.355 
11 JAP -2.655** -2.063 JAP -2.663** -2.351 
10 SWE -2.748** -2.070 SWE -2.627** -2.347 
9 DEN -2.645** -2.075 DEN -2.666** -2.343 
8 USA -2.404** -2.081 IRE -2.440** -2.339 
7 IRE -2.297** -2.087 None -2.316 -2.335 
6 ITA -2.251** -2.093    
5 GER -2.759** -2.100    
4 None -2.044 -2.105    
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) 
18 NOR -3.763** -2.022 NOR -3.780** -2.378 
17 FRA -3.569** -2.028 FRA -3.370** -2.374 
16 FIN -3.472** -2.033 FIN -3.492** -2.370 
15 SPA -3.259** -2.039 GER -3.290** -2.366 
14 DEN -3.287** -2.046 DEN -3.374** -2.363 
13 IRE -2.607** -2.051 UKD -2.908** -2.359 
12 UKD -2.499** -2.057 NEW -2.726** -2.355 
11 NEW -2.381** -2.063 IRE -2.726** -2.351 
10 CAN -2.182** -2.069 KOR -2.857** -2.348 
9 None -1.964 -2.074 JAP -2.631** -2.343 
8    SWE -2.494** -2.339 
7    CAN -2.437** -2.336 
6    None -2.094 -2.331 
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑝5$𝑡) 
18 NOR -3.912** -2.022 NOR -3.938** -2.379 
17 FRA -3.727** -2.028 FRA -3.758** -2.375 
16 FIN -3.620** -2.033 GER -3.654** -2.370 
15 GER -3.416** -2.039 FIN -3.404** -2.367 
14 DEN -3.444** -2.046 DEN -3.470** -2.363 
13 IRE -3.067** -2.052 UKD -3.097** -2.359 
12 CAN -2.975** -2.058 IRE -2.942** -2.355 
11 UKD -2.892** -2.064 SWE -2.830** -2.351 
10 SWE -2.758** -2.070 JAP -3.031** -2.348 
9 JAP -2.940** -2.076 CAN -2.590** -2.344 
8 NEW -2.369** -2.082 NEW -2.364** -2.340 
7 KOR -2.140** -2.088 None -2.134** -2.336 
6 USA -2.213** -2.094    
5 ITA -2.131** -2.100    
4 BEL -2.109** -2.106    




Table A5 (continued) 
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡)  









18 KOR -3.479** -2.022 KOR -3.434** -2.378 
17 GER -3.359** -2.028 GER -3.345** -2.374 
16 USA -3.348** -2.034 USA -3.349** -2.371 
15 SPA -3.143** -2.040 SPA -3.152** -2.366 
14 JAP -3.149** -2.045 JAP -3.155** -2.362 
13 NET -3.126** -2.051 NET -3.137** -2.358 
12 SWE -3.122** -2.057 ITA -3.097** -2.354 
11 ITA -3.109** -2.063 SWE -3.088** -2.350 
10 AUS -3.087** -2.069 AUS -3.081** -2.347 
9 CAN -2.827** -2.076 CAN -2.780** -2.342 
8 BEL -3.001** -2.081 BEL -2.887** -2.339 
7 IRE -2.887** -2.087 IRE -2.793** -2.335 
6 FRA -2.489** -2.094 None -2.301 -2.331 
5 FIN -2.526** -2.100    
4 DEN -2.567** -2.106    
3 UKD -2.452 -2.112    
2 None -1.809 -2.120    
Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡) 
18 None -1.780 -2.020 None -2.279 -2.376 
Variable: ∆𝑟𝑡 
18 SWE -2.913** -2.020 SWE -2.868** -2.376 
17 NEW -2.718** -2.026 NEW -2.642** -2.372 
16 JAP -3.040** -2.032 JAP -3.143** -2.369 
15 IRE -2.535** -2.535 IRE -2.657** -2.365 
14 AUS -2.346** -2.043 None -2.302 -2.360 
13 SPA -2.149** -2.049    
12 CAN -2.330** -2.056    
11 BEL -2.353** -2.062    
10 FRA -2.306** -2.068    
9 ITA -2.096** -2.072    
8 None -1.887 -2.080    
Table notes. See Table A4 notes. 
Additional reference for the appendix 
Cerrato, M., de Peretti, C., and Stewart, C. (2013) ‘Is the consumption-income ratio stationary? 
Evidence from linear and nonlinear panel unit root tests for OECD and non-OECD 
countries’, The Manchester School, 81(1), pp. 102–120. 
 
 
 
 
